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NOTES
CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING:
A TOOL FOR ZONING FLEXIBILITY
Traditional zoning practices often create difficulties when applied
to individual parcels of land. One such difficulty occurs where the
owner of an individual parcel needs it rezoned to effectuate a more
favorable use of his land, and the bare zoning change may result in
hardship to neighboring property owners or a substantial burden to
the municipality. In an effort to resolve this dilemma, some states have
permitted local legislatures to exact promises or performances from land-
owners designed to ameliorate the hardships, in return for granting the
requested zoning change. Such a process is called contract or condi-
tional zoning. This note will survey the harshness of traditional zoning
regulations in certain situations and the applicability of contract and
conditional zoning as a viable and flexible alternative. It will critically
analyze several arguments offered against the process and examine the
various methods by which it is effectuated. Finally, the note will dis-
cuss the unclear state of current California law in this area and recom-
mend the express adoption of contract and conditional zoning within
certain guidelines as a desirable step towards more beneficial land use
control.
The Need for Flexibility in Zoning
The Zoning Process
The zoning process has been described as "the legal point of im-
pact at which the public regulation of land use is made legally effec-
tive."' It involves the determination by local governments of how local
land will be used. The state confers the ability on cities and counties
to exercise police power,2 thereby enabling the local legislative body to
1. D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DmEm.s 4 (1971).
2. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. The states set out certain procedural regula-
tions and substantive limitations on the exercise of this power through state zoning en-
abling statutes, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65800-912 (West 1966), as amended, (West
Supp. 1971). According to Government Code section 65803 (West 1966) chartered cities
are exempt from the code's zoning provisions. Their zoning guidelines are taken from
the charter itself. Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 439-40, 271 P. 487,
493 (1928). If the charter is silent as to zoning guidelines, the chartered city is subject to
the state enabling law. Ferris v. City of Alhambra, 189 Cal. App. 2d 517, 521, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 475, 477 (1961).
set up zoning classifications by ordinance.3 Usually, the local legisla-
tive body further delegates participation in the process to appropriate
administrative agencies who administer the ordinance and recommend
zoning changes.4
Zoning changes by local governments are often the subject of con-
troversy. Since affected landowners and the local legislative or admin-
istrative bodies generally disagree on the use of land,5 resolving these
conflicting claims presents no easy task.6 The rigidity of the almost
universally practiced "Euclidian zoning"7 process bears much responsi-
bility for this difficulty. Such zoning is characterized by strict district-
ing of land use so that only a limited number of uses are permitted in
each zone classification. 8 As a result, land within a zone will be limited
to certain uses for the sake of homogeneity even though alternative uses,
beneficial to the landowner if allowed in some situations, would have
only a minimal effect on the overall zoning scheme.9
The arbitrariness of the Euclidian approach is most apparent in
two situations: (1) where property is located on the borderline between
two zone districts, and (2) where a district is undergoing change of
use.' ° Where adjacent districts are subject to different restrictions the
property on the common boundary is caught in the crush between com-
peting uses. If the property is restricted to the use of the higher zoned
district, the value and usefulness of the property may be depreciated.
If the use of the lower zoned district is allowed, the value of adjacent
property restricted to a higher use is affected. Where a district is in
the process of change from a higher use to a lower one, such as from
residential to limited commercial use, the higher uses need temporary
protection from a sudden influx of lower uses which will eventually
come. Without such protection the value of the higher uses will swiftly
depreciate. If the landowner is restricted to using his land as zoned,
an orderly transition is not assured. Clearly, some degree of flexibility
3. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West Supp. 1971).
4. E.g., id. §§ 65901-908.
5. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.01 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; 1 A. RATHKOPF & C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING §§ 28.1-29.16 (3d ed. 1969).
6. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 8.17.
7. This form of zoning is so named because this was the type of ordinance liti-
gated in the landmark decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
8. See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note 5, §§ 8.14-.15.
9. Euclidian zoning is "incapable of accommodating the whole complex of land
uses, and it cannot be tailored to the specific needs of a community without the creation
of an unwieldy number and variety of districts." 1 ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 8.17,
at 604.
10. ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 8.20; Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REv.
121 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Trager].
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in zoning is needed to buffer adjacent zones, to ease an area from one
zoning classification into another, or to mitigate the hardships caused
by zoning changes to other peculiarly situated parcels of land.1
Traditional Methods of Achieving Flexibility
The lack of flexibility in borderline and other exceptional situa-
tions led early zoning planners to provide relief in the form of variances
and conditional use permits."2 While these forms of relief are granted
only by administrative agencies,'" local legislatures have also sought
methods of achieving zoning flexibility.
A variance permits a parcel of land to be used differently from
the basic uses permitted by its zoning classification. Before a variance
will be granted the landowner must show a special hardship caused by
restricting his property to the uses permitted by the zoning classifica-
tion.' 4 To ameliorate any hardship which the variance may cause to
neighboring landowners special conditions may be imposed upon the
applicant as a condition to the granting of the variance.' 5 A condi-
tional use permit also allows a special use other than those permitted by
the zoning classification. Originally it was developed as a device to
provide for uses which would not be appropriate at all locations of any
zone classification' 6 and was used for such facilities as airports, ceme-
teries, dumps, libraries, or public utfilities. 7 In recent years, some ad-
ministrative agencies have greatly expanded the use of such permits in
an effort to achieve zoning flexibility by precise control of uses not
statutorily permitted in the zone classification.' 8 Standards for granting
the permits are established by the zoning ordinance, and local ordi-
nances vary the types of standards imposed.' 9 Restrictions on the land
use upon which the granting of the permit is conditioned may also be
imposed upon the landowner in conjunction with the conditional use
permit.20
11. As one court commented: "So-called Euclidean zoning divides the community
into homogeneous land use zones. Individual parcels may often be allowed a justified es-
cape from this rigid grouping without detriment to zoning objectives." Scrutton v.
County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 417-18, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 877 (1969).
12. D. HAG AN, I. LMSON & C. MARTIN, CALIFoRNIA ZONING PRACIC. § 1.7
(Cal. Cont. Edue. Bar ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN].
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65901 (West 1966).
14. Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d 619, 627, 339
P.2d 914, 919 (1959); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65906 (West 1966).
15. See notes 23-27 & accompanying text infra.
16. IAGmAN, supra note 12, § 7.58.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 7.59.
19. Id. at § 7.67.
20. See notes 28-35 & accompanying text infra.
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Apart from these administrative remedies, some local legislatures
have sought to achieve flexibility through changes in the zoning ordi-
nance itself. One method is commonly called spot zoning. This term
generally refers to the rezoning of a small parcel of land to a use classi-
fication different from that imposed upon surrounding parcels.2 The
process is often looked upon with disfavor by the courts as constituting
zoning which is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan. How-
ever, it may be approved in certain situations .
2 2
The Need for an Alternative
Although local zoning administrative agencies may impose extrin-
sic conditions on landowners upon the granting of a variance 23 or a
conditional use permit24 to tailor the land use to the needs of the com-
munity, in practice this approach may be insufficient for either the land-
owner or the community.25 For example, the landowner may be unable
to make the requisite showing of a special hardship caused by the pres-
ent restrictions to entitle him to a variance. 2 6 Moreover, recent Cali-
fornia decisions indicate that an administrative finding of such special
hardship will be carefully scrutinized by the courts, thereby making a
variance even more difficult to obtain.27
21. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 5.17.
22. Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); 1
ANDERSON, supra note 5, at §§ 5.04-5.06. See notes 67-73 & accompanying text in-
fra.
23. Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1960); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (West Supp. 1971).
24. Fisher, Land Use Control Through Zoning: The San Francisco Experience,
13 HASTINGS L.J. 322, 329-30 (1962).
25. Two California cases, Somers v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d
605, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1967) and Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 242
Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 647 (1967), have
upheld the imposition of extrinsic conditions upon a landowner prior to the issuance of
a building permit. If conditions could be imposed at any time upon the granting of a
building permit the ends of contract and conditional zoning could be accomplished for
an agreement in conjunction with the passage of a zoning ordinance. However, these
cases are not authority for the proposition that such conditions could be imposed where
the conditions were not equally and statutorily applicable to all similar land uses within
the same zoning classification. Both cases dealt with section 12.37 of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code which imposed a uniform condition precedent for the issuance of a
building permit on any lot in an R3 or less restricted zone. The courts, in upholding the
constitutionality of the ordinance dealt with it on the basis that it was a part of the city's
master plan. Apart from this particular situation, California case law holds that where
the requirements of the zoning law have been met, the issuance of a building permit is a
mere ministerial act which cannot be denied, unless there is authority for the denial in a
valid, enforceable ordinance. See, e.g., McCombs v. Larson, 176 Cal. App. 2d 105, 1
Cal. Rptr. 140 (1959); Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 314 P.2d 67 (1957).
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (West Supp. 1971).
27. E.g., Hamilton v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Cal. App. 2d 64, 75 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1969).
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Conditional use permits, like variances, must meet certain statutory
standards and may only be granted in accordance with criteria estab-
lished within the terms of the local zoning ordinance.2 8  These criteria
may vary from a specific standard, such as a listing of uses in each dis-
trict for which the permit may be granted,29 to a broad, general welfare
type standard." One court summarized the general welfare type stand-
ard as requiring a showing that
[the] use is essential or desirable to the public convenience or wel-
fare and at the same time that it will not impair the integrity and
character of the zoned district. It must also be shown that it is
not detrimental to public health, public morals, or public welfare.31
Although the general welfare type standards offer a greater degree of
flexibility, they cannot be so broad as to amount to a delegation of an
absolute legislative discretion to the administrative agency.3 2 This is
the danger inherent in the actions of those administrative agencies which
have expanded the scope of the conditional use permit far beyond its
original purpose.33 If the administrative agency in effect becomes a re-
zoning body it has exceeded its authority and should be curtailed by
either the legislature or the courts. 4
If the availability of the conditional use permit is not strictly lim-
ited by statute, it may be limited by its very nature. The permit is an
administrative grant, not a legislative zoning change, and many land-
owners may not wish to risk a large investment, such as a shopping cen-
ter, on a land use change guaranteed only by a conditional use permit.
Thus, there are many situations in which a landowner must have a re-
zoning to effectively accomplish his desired land use, either because of
his inability to get a variance or because of his inability to qualify for
or unwillingness to seek a conditional use permit.
3 5
28. HAGMAN, supra note 12, § 7.58.
29. The San Francisco zoning ordinance is an example of this type. Fisher,
supra note 24, at 329.
30. See Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d 544, 84 Cal. Rpr. 443 (1970).
31. Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d 619, 626, 339
P.2d 914, 919 (1959).
32. People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 2d 881, 885-86, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783-84,
(1963).
33. HAGMAN, supra note 12, § 7.58.
34. One writer suggests that the reason California courts in the past have allowed
general statements of standards for the granting of a conditional use permit is the former
California practice of having legislative bodies pass on the permit. Now that California
Government Code section 65903 makes administrative decisions final, more specific
standards may be required. Id. § 7.67.
35. This is shown by several California cases in which it is evident from the fac-
tual situation that the rezoning was subject to conditions extrinsic from the ordinance.
See Johnson v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958); Scrutton v.
County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969); Richter v.
Oftentimes such rezoning will cause a real hardship to neighboring
property owners, and under traditional Euclidian zoning theory, the
municipality must choose between the needs of the landowner and
those of the neighboring property owners. This problem is well illus-
trated by a hypothetical situation. A landowner may own a large parcel
of land on a major thoroughfare which is surrounded by residential
property. He may consider the best use to which he could put the
property to be a shopping center. Possibly, he could not meet the cri-
teria for a variance or a conditional use permit. Even if the statutory
criteria for a conditional use permit are sufficiently general so he can
meet them, the administrative agency may be appropriately hesitant to
grant an administrative exception which in effect would amount to an
actual legislative decision to rezone. Thus, if the landowner is unable
to meet the criteria or is otherwise denied an administrative exception
he will seek a change in the zoning ordinance.
If the change is denied, the city and the area will lose the benefits
of the shopping center development. Further, the value of the property
to the landowner is diminished because of its lack of desirability for
residential use. If the change is granted, residential property owners
in the area will be harmed by the increased noise, traffic, lights, and
other factors appurtenant to a commercial use. If the property were
rezoned to the basic uses permitted by a commercial classification, but
its use were restricted by a concomitant agreement, the landowner would
get the zoning ordinance he needed and the hardship to the neighbors
could be significantly ameliorated." This could be done by an agree-
ment incorporating noise abatement, traffic control, building setback,
fencing, screening of lights, and other appropriate restrictions enabling
the center to blend into the surrounding neighborhood. Such a third
choice through the use of contract or conditional zoning would add
needed flexibility as an adjunct to Euclidian zoning's rigidity in dealing
with these peculiarly placed parcels of land.37
Contract or Conditional Zoning as a Viable Alternative
Contract or conditional zoning is the process of imposing, by pri-
vate agreement, land use restrictions upon a parcel which are extrinsic
Board of Supervisors, 259 Cal. App. 2d 99, 66 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1968); Leonard Corp. v.
City of San Diego, 210 Cal. App. 2d 547, 26 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1962); Adler v. City Coun-
cil, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960). Of these cases, only Scrutton dis-
cusses the validity of contract zoning. For cases from other jurisdictions discussing the
validity of such zoning see notes 55-58 infra. For an appreciation of the age of the
method see Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707 (1930).
36. This procedure was used in San Francisco in approving the Stonestown Shop-
ping Center under a provision of the city's 1921 zoning ordinance. Fisher, supra note
24, at 330-31, n.15.
37. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 8.20; Trager, supra note 10.
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to the rezoning amendment and which are imposed in conjunction with
the passage of the amendment. Each term is only applicable to certain
types of methods used to effectuate the process. 8  The term contract
zoning can only be properly applied to a situation in which the prop-
erty owner provides consideration to the local governing body in the
form of an enforceable promise to do or not to do a certain thing in
regard to his property in return for the zoning legislation which he seeks
or an enforceable promise by the city for such legislation. In this pro-
cedure the landowner's promise is not effective until the passage of the
legislation.
The term conditional zoning can only be properly applied to a
situation in which a zoning ordinance is passed upon condition that a
landowner perform a certain act prior to, simultaneously with, or after
the passage of the zoning ordinance. In such a situation the passage
or effectiveness of the legislation is conditional upon the landowner's
act, and there is no enforceable contract. This absence of a promise
which is enforceable as against the landowner distinguishes conditional
from contract zoning.
The land use restrictions imposed through contract or conditional
zoning are generally of two types. The first type is a restriction di-
rectly limiting the use of the rezoned property. It may limit the prop-
erty to a single use3 9 or it may place building size, 40 openspace, 41 or
similar restrictions on the landowner's use of the property. The other
type of restriction requires some act on the part of the landowner. This
38. The general term "contract zoning" has been used to describe this process.
Trager, supra note 10; Comment, The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning, 12 U.C.L.A.L
REv. 897 (1965). This broad use of the term is inappropriate and has been judicially
described as without legal significance. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 412, 419, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (1969); Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254,
259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1960). This lack of legal signifi-
cance can probably be ascribed to the fact that there are numerous ways in which the
corresponding commitment from the landowner can be obtained. What is needed are
terms which describe these methods with sufficient particularity to be useful in the legal
framework. Where an attempt to define these methods with particularity has been
made, it is generally phrased in terms of contract zoning and conditonal zoning, with
varying definitions of the two. The distinction is usually based on the proposition that
contract zoning is invalid and conditional zoning is valid. Compare 1 ANDERsoN,
supra note 5, §§ 8.20-8.21, with Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP.
L.Q. 267 (1968). However, even this approach is not an accurate description of the
ways in which local legislatures and landowners effect rezoning in conjunction with the
imposition of conditions upon the landowner.
39. State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
40. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1960).
41. Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118
(1962).
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may include requiring the landowner to make improvements on the
property such as construction of a wall,42 or to dedicate other property
for park43 or street purposes," or to make payment of money to meet
street improvement" or other expenses necessitated by the newly per-
mitted use.
Whatever type of agreement the city exacts from the landowner, its
general purpose is usually for the benefit of the neighbors to ameliorate
the hardship of the zoning change4 6 or for the benefit of the city as a
whole to meet the need for increased city services caused by the zon-
ing change.47 This policy was succinctly expressed by a California
court:
Like other changes in land use, the rezoning of an individual parcel
may benefit the landowner but generate augmented demands for
public services or create deleterious effects in the neighborhood.
Reasonably conceived conditions harmonize the landowner's need
with the public's interest.
4 8
Therefore, in certain situations where more traditional solutions do
not meet the need, contract and conditional zoning provide benefi-
cial and viable alternatives. Since the purpose of zoning is, in the last
analysis, to make the best possible land use for the benefit of all citi-
zens, a rigid adherence to early zoning concepts should not be permitted
to block the adoption of this valuable tool of land use control.
The Legality of Contract and Conditional Zoning
Contract and conditional zoning seems to attract much criticism
from the courts. Even where its legality has been recognized the courts
have sometimes minimized its value by unduly restricting its use. The
highest courts of twelve states have ruled on contract or conditional
zoning in one form or another. Of these, five have held it invalid,49
42. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
43. City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
44. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1969).
45. State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
46. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1960).
47. State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
48. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 418, 79 Cal. Rptr.
872, 877 (1969).
49. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Au-
tomotive Prods. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952); Allred v. City of Raleigh,
277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); Oury v. Greany, 267 A.2d 700 (R.I. 1970); City
of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953). In addition, lower
courts in at least two states have held contract or conditional zoning invalid. Hedrich
v. Village of Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791 (App. Ct. 1969); Coston v. Up-
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and six have found it valid.m0 In one state, contract zoning was held
invalid in one form51 but valid in another.52
The various courts which have disapproved contract or condi-
tional zoning have advanced several arguments against it. One recur-
ring ground for finding these techniques invalid has been that the mu-
nicipality has entered into a private contract with a property owner for
a zoning amendment and therefore abrogated its police power." Thus,
where the local legislature actually promises to make a zoning change,
or upon rezoning promises to maintain the rezoned classification for a
certain period of time in return for a promise from the property owner,
the legislative body has bargained away part of its governmental func-
tion. Although California, 54 along with nearly every jurisdiction in
the United States,55 strictly prohibits such an agreement, a close exami-
nation of the cases indicates that no actual promises were made by the
cities in question.56 Rather, the contractual agreements have been in
the nature of a unilateral contract in which the city acts to rezone in re-
turn for the landowner's promise. Under this method the legislature
makes no binding promise and there is simply no abrogation of the
per Merion Township, 88 Montg. Co. L.R. 383 (CL Quarter Sess. 1965), appeal
quashed, 435 Pa. 67, 255 A.2d 565 (1969). The Supreme Court of Mississippi has
stated in dictum that conditions and limitations may not be imposed on the rezoning
of property. Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1966). However, a later
decision allows, subject to certain restrictions, conditions contained in an ordinance.
Yates v. Mayor and Commissioners, 244 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1971).
50. Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 213 (1966); Sylvania
Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Bucholz v.
City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963); Church v. Town of Islip, 8
N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960); State ex rel. Myhre v. City of
Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46
Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970). Pecora v. Zoning Comm'n, 145 Conn. 435, 144
A.2d 48 (1958) is sometimes cited as the first case to approve conditional zoning.
However, it is doubtful that the case is authoritative for that position in the light of sub-
sequent Connecticut legislation CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2, construed in Summ v.
Zoning Comm'n, 150 Conn. 79, 186 A.2d 160 (1962).
51. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
52. City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967).
53. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore,
219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (1959).
54. Wills v. City of Los Angeles, 209 Cal. 448, 287 P. 962 (1930).
55. 10 E. McQumLAN, THE LAw oF MuNiciPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.07 (3d ed.
rev. 1966) and cases cited therein; 56 AM. Jun. 2D Municipal Corporations § 198
(1971); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 88 (1958).
56. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore,
219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959). There appears to be only two reported cases in
which a city actually promised to rezone, both involving the transfer of land by a
municipality. In Herr v. City of St. Petersburg, 114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959) the whole
contract was found valid. In New Prods. Corp. v. City of North Miami, 241 So. 2d
451 (Fla. 1970) all of the contract was upheld except the rezoning provision.
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police power.57 The courts, however, have failed to make this neces-
sary distinction.58
Another argument opposing contract and conditional zoning is that
even though a promise has not been made, the municipality has com-
promised its governmental function by making a restrictive agreement in
conjunction with rezoning and has thus violated public policy. Pro-
ponents of this reasoning argue that such agreements have no place in a
zoning plan and should not enter into the enactment or enforcement of
zoning legislation:59
They strike at the very foundations of government and intend to
destroy that confidence in the integrity and discretion of public
action which is essential to the preservation of civilized society. 60
Behind such flowery phrases, the concern seems to be that the agree-
ment has blurred the legislative judgment of the municipality 61 or that
such a process is likely to lead to official misconduct.6 2 However, this
fear is unfounded because the ordinance passed in conjunction with the
agreement is subjected to the same reasonableness test under the police
power as any other zoning ordinance. Furthermore, contract and con-
ditional zoning should be permitted only under appropriate guidelines
to insure proper use.63
Several courts have held that the land use restrictions imposed in
contract or conditional zoning destroy zoning uniformity and eliminate
the benefits of and reasons for a well-ordered, comprehensive zoning
scheme.64 Massachusetts considered and rejected this argument, stating
there was no failure to conform to the comprehensive plan in contract
zoning:
It is inconsequential that other areas elsewhere in the city, in, or
to be put in, such a zoning district, would not have those restric-
tions. Requirements of uniformity and conformity to a plan do
57. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 419, 79 Cal. Rptr.
872, 878 (1969); Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1960).
58. Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 267, 270 (1968).
59. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 129,
87 A.2d 319, 322 (1952); City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 7, 263 S.W.2d
528, 530 (1953).
60. City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 7, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530 (1953).
61. Shapiro, supra note 58, at 271.
62. Comment, The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
897, 903 (1965).
63. See notes 122-24 & accompanying text infra.
64. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of Baltimore,
219 Md. 164, 169, 148 A.2d 429, 433 (1959). The basis of this argument is that zoning
statutes generally require uniform zoning regulation. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852
(West 1966).
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not mean that there must be identity of every relevant aspect in
areas given the same zoning classification. 65
Moreover, strict uniformity in many instances would lead to arbitrary
determinations and undue hardships. 6
Contract and conditional zoning has been further condemned as an
invalid form of spot zoning. 67 Spot zoning refers to a legislative zoning
amendment which classifies a small parcel of land in a manner different
from that of the surrounding area.68 The size of the area subject to the
zoning amendment is the most important factor in determining whether
a measure constitutes spot zoning.69 This consideration is quite differ-
ent from those used to determine if there has been contract or condi-
tional zoning.
Thus, contract and conditional zoning is not necessarily a form of
spot zoning.70 As with all land use regulations, the validity of both
forms of rezoning should depend upon the reasonableness of the re-
zoning in relation to neighboring uses.71 Thus, their validity or in-
validity should be determined by examining the use of each method in
the light of established zoning principles, not by the arbitrary, general
exclusion of both methods. Certainly, the general objection to spot
zoning is irrelevant to the validity of contract or conditional zoning
methods. 72 Moreover, contract or conditional zoning can alleviate much
of the harshness of spot zoning by tailoring the zoning change so that
the land use is more responsive to the needs of the area.
73
65. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 434, 183
N.E.2d 118, 122 (1962).
66. See notes 10-11, 35-37 & accompanying text supra.
67. Rathkopf summarizes the present weight of authority as follows: "[R]ezoning
of a particular parcel of land upon conditions not imposed by the zoning ordinance gen-
eraly in the particular district into which the land has been rezoned is prima facie
evidence of 'spot zoning' in its most maleficent aspect ...... 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE
LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNiNG 74-9 (3d ed. 1971).
68. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 5, § 5.04 (1968). See notes 21-22 & accompany-
ing text supra.
69. Id. § 5.07; Comment, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRA-
CUSE L. Rlv. 303 (1959).
70. For example, a relatively large area may be rezoned industrial with certain
ecological restrictions contractually or conditionally placed on the rezoning. The size
of the area could preclude the charge of spot zoning.
71. See Wilkins v. San Bernadino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); Kissinger
v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
72. Trager, supra note 10, at 140.
73. The courts which have held contract or conditional zoning invalid have prof-
fered several other arguments against its validity. One of these asserts that the change
in the zoning ordinance was per se unjustifiable because the imposition of conditions
shows that existing circumstances did not justify rezoning the parcel. Hartnett v. Austin,
93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956). However, as was recognized by New York in Church v.
Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869, (1960),
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In dealing with a contract or conditional zoning controversy, a
court should be cognizant of the various effects its final determination
will have on the community. If it chooses to invalidate the technique,
it has three options: (1) to invalidate the agreement and allow the
ordinance to stand; (2) to invalidate the ordinance and allow the agree-
ment to stand; or (3) to invalidate both. Generally its decision will
depend upon who brought the action into court and what relief is being
sought. Thus, in efforts to enforce the agreement against the land-
owner or a subsequent taker, the courts have usually invalidated the
agreement and made no ruling on the ordinance, thus allowing it to
stand.74 Therefore, the landowner gets the ordinance he sought without
the protective restrictions previously obtained by the city.
If the validity of the ordinance is challenged, the court might only
invalidate the ordinance and make no holding as to the continuing effect
of the agreement. 75 If the agreement is of such a nature or in such a
form that it will have no effect once the ordinance is declared invalid,
this creates no problem. However, if the agreement is formed in the
manner of a restrictive covenant running with the land, there is
the danger that the promises made will remain in force even though
the ordinance is no longer valid. Another possible situation is that the
court may be faced with a challenge to the validity of the ordinance and
find the ordinance valid but the agreement invalid. 76 Thus the neigh-
boring property owners who attacked the ordinance lose the protection
of the agreement and are left with the zoning change alone.
Though ample authority is available to support the contention that
contract and conditional zoning is a desirable and useful adjunct to the
zoning process, much authority condemns it as well. However, the argu-
ments advanced to support the process are based on a common sense
conditions are imposed in many instances in which the parcel could have been rezoned
without the restrictions. The imposition of land use restrictions shows the legislative
body recognized a problem peculiar to the area. It does not show the zoning change was
unjustifiable. Other arguments against the process are that zoning restrictions should
all be in the ordinance and not left to extrinsic evidence, Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d
86, 89 (Fla. 1956), and that there is a lack of statutory authority for the imposition of
restrictions in conjunction with a rezoning ordinance, Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219
Md. 164, 168-69, 148 A.2d 429, 432 (1959). These are discussed at length in Trager,
supra note 10.
74. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87
A.2d 319 (1952); City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
75. Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
76. Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960). Note
that this differs from the situation described in the text accompanying note 74 supra, in
that here the challenge is to the validity of the ordinance and the plaintiffs are neighbor-
ing property owners who oppose the ordinance. In the previous situation the action was
brought to enfoice the agreement, and in such cases the plaintiff is generally the city or
one who supports the validity of the ordinance.
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approach to land use controls while those against it seem rooted in an
unfounded fear that the process somehow abrogates the ability of the
legislature to provide uniform zoning regulations.
The Methods of Contract and Conditional Zoning
If contract and conditional zoning are to be valid and appropriate
devices to regulate land use, the method by which the legislature im-
poses the extrinsic conditions on the landowner will require careful con-
sideration. Obviously, if the city cannot enforce the agreement, it is
meaningless, and the process is useless. Thus, the various methods of
contract and conditional zoning which municipalities have used will be
examined with a view toward their enforceability as well as their legal-
ity and effectiveness.
Unilaterial Contract Between City and Landowner
A contract which provides that in consideration for the municipal
legislature's passage of a zoning ordinance the landowner covenants to
restrict his land use is, in traditional contractual terms, a unilateral
contract. The city has made no binding promise and thus there is no
abrogation of the police power.77 The legislature may enforce the con-
tract on the basis of specific performance 7 s and if the contract also pro-
vides for covenants running with the land, it is enforceable by the city
as against subsequent takers of the rezoned property.79 Since the prom-
ise is not binding until the rezoning legislation is passed, the landowner
is also protected. Thus such a procedure affords ample protection to
the general public since the local legislature is not bargaining away its
police power. In addition, the particular landowner is afforded some
measure of assurance he will be able to use his property as planned. Be-
cause of its ready enforceability and wide adaptability, this method ap-
pears to be the most generally effective.80
77. Such a process was upheld in State ex reL Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash.
2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967); Comment, Zoning and Concomitant Agreements, 3
GONZAGA L. RaV. 197 (1968). The opinion of the court is unclear as to the nature of the
agreement. The author of the Comment examined the records of the trial court in
which the agreement is set out in full. For a discussion of contract zoning and abroga-
tion of the police power see notes 53-58 & accompanying text supra.
78. See Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 421, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872, 879 (1969) (dictum).
79. In Myhre the validity of the covenant running with the land was doubly en-
sured by the passing of deeds to the city, creating a dominant estate capable of enforcing
the covenants. Zoning and Concomitant Agreements, supra note 77, at 204 n.40.
80. For an extreme example of judicial rigidity in failing to recognize that without
a promise to rezone there is no abrogation of the police power see Allred v. City of Ra-
leigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971). In that case the landowner's attorney
orally promised the legislative body that buildings on the parcel would be designed in a
Bilateral Contract Between Planning Commission and Landowner
A bilateral contract between a city and a landowner which includes
a binding promise by the city to rezone property in accordance with
the terms of the contract amounts to an illegal abrogation of the city's
police power.8' However, a contract between a planning commission
and a landowner in which the planning commission promises to favorably
recommend the passage of the zoning legislation in return for the land-
owner's promise to restrict his land use may not be invalid.8 2  The
planning commission's contractual consideration given to the landowner
is only that of a favorable recommendation, which is no abrogation of
the police power. The landowner can be protected by a condition
precedent that the contract will not be effective until the zoning change
is granted. The contract is capable of enforcement by specific per-
formance.83 Although this method has been tried only in Maryland,
and the experience there provides scant authority, the procedure de-
serves consideration as an appropriate method of contract zoning.
certain manner if the zoning legislation were passed. The court invalidated the
legislation, declaring: "Rezoning on consideration of assurances that a particular tract
or parcel will be developed in accordance with restricted approved plans is not a permis-
sible ground for placing the property in a zone where restrictions of the nature pre-
scribed are not otherwise required or contemplated. Rezoning must be effected by the
exercise of legislative power rather than by special arrangements with the owner of a
particular tract or parcel of land." Id. at 545, 178 S.E.2d at 441.
81. See notes 53-58 & accompanying text supra.
82. The Maryland Court of Appeals has upheld a similar contract between a city
and a landowner. See City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967).
In this case the city had essentially assumed the role of a planning commission. Its only
authority was to recommend on zoning legislation affecting it. Actual legislative zoning
responsibility was held by a regional governing body. The unique situation here stems
from the fact that the property in question was in that part of Maryland which abuts
Washington D.C. The legislative zoning body for this area is the Maryland-Washington
Regional District of Prince George's County. Before the legislation is considered, rec-
ommendations are obtained from the municipality involved, and the regional planning
commission. The holding in this case was reaffirmed in Funger v. Mayor and Council.
249 Md. 311, 239 A.2d 748 (1968). Although seven years earlier this same Maryland
court had specifically held invalid a similar contract between a planning commission and
a landowner in Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960), there
would seem to be no reason why such a contract should not now be valid under the
Greenbelt decision. In Pressman the court based its decision on the ground that the
planning commission lacked the authority to exact such an agreement. However, in
Greenbelt the court distinguished Pressman on the ground that in that case the contract
was made in the name of the full corporate title of the city and there was an improper
influence on the city itself which was the deciding authority as to the rezoning, whereas
in Greenbelt the deciding authority was in no manner a party to the contract and there
was no danger of influence on the legislative zoning judgment. City of Greenbelt v.
Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 216, 236 A.2d 1, 4 (1967).
83. Moreover, by following appropriate statutory procedure as in California Civil
Code section 1468 (West Supp. 1971) the contract may also be made a covenant run-
ning with the land.
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Ordinance Conditioned Upon a Physical Act to the Property
A popular form of conditional zoning is to condition the passage
of the rezoning amendment upon the performance of some act on the
rezoned property. There are several ways in which this method may
be implemented. First, the local legislature may require the landowner
to accomplish work on the property before the rezoning legislation is
considered. 84  This method places an undue burden on the landowner
since he may expend funds in performing the required acts to the prop-
erty only to find the rezoning ordinance rejected and his alterations in
violation of the present ordinances. Further, the procedure is of limited
value to the city since no continuing restriction on land use can be
imposed on the property. However, the method seems constitutionally
valid since there is no binding contract involved, and there is sub-
stantially less danger of a judicial challenge.
In a second approach the city may pass the ordinance but make
its effectiveness contingent upon the landowner's compliance with re-
strictions contained in the ordinance.8 5 There has been little discussion
of this approach, but in the main, it has been unfavorably received by
both the courts and legal writers. A New York court held such an
ordinance invalid because it was not immediately effective and instead
purported to change zoning in the future after the conditions were
met.8 6 Two writers have suggested that this procedure would result
in the creation of innumerable new use classifications-one for each
landowner seeking a special use-which would unnecessarily overcom-
plicate the statute.8 7 Another feels that in the light of zoning enabling
statutes which require uniform regulations throughout each district, re-
strictions in the ordinance could not be imposed on one area within a
zoning classification which were not imposed on all similarly zoned
areas.
8 8
84. Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396 P.2d 271 (1964).
85. Yates v. Mayor & Commissioners, 244 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1971) in which a
restriction was placed in the ordinance that before a building permit was issued provi-
sion for adequate off-street parking must be made. In the face of dictum in Lewis v. City
of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1966), which stated a general rule that conditions
and limitations may not be imposed in the rezoning of property, the court upheld the or-
dinance. The court based its decision on the fact that the zoning ordinance of the city
required off-street parking for this type of zone. It indicated that under such circum-
stances the ordinance was valid.
86. Levine v. Town of Oyster Bay, 46 Misc. 2d 106, 259 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct.
1964), affd on other grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 183, 272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1966); cf. Pier-
son Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Ky. 1960) where it was held that an
ordinance which permitted rezoning on the condition that only one use was permissible
was unconstitutional.
87. Shapiro, supra note 58, at 280; see Trager, supra note 10, at 143-44.
88. Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land-Use Control, 67 Dic. L. REv. 109,
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A major disadvantage of this procedure is that the specific restric-
tions become an integral part of the ordinance and may quickly outlive
their usefulness. One of the major applications of conditional or con-
tract zoning is in an area that is in the process of change from one use
to another. Once this change has been completed there is generally no
further need for the restrictions, but the restrictions are a part of the
ordinance and can only be removed by going through the full amendment
process. In light of these difficulties, this method of conditional zoning
does not seem to be a satisfactory approach.
As another variation, the city may pass the ordinance with a pro-
vision that the property will revert to the original zoning classification
if the specified conditions are not met. This approach has been gen-
erally condemned as a violation of both procedural and substantive lim-
itations of the zoning power because it amounts to a second rezoning
without following the requisite procedural steps.8 9  Such a method of
enforcing the conditions cannot be valid.
Ordinance Conditioned Upon an Act Involving Other Property
A municipality may require dedication of other land as a condition
precedent to its favorable consideration of the requested rezoning
amendment.90 Although there is the danger that the landowner may
dedicate the land and the city then refuse to pass the zoning ordi-
nance,9 he may protect himself by a condition precedent in the grant
that the dedication is not to be effective until the zoning legislation is
enacted. The enforcement procedure is a simple refusal to pass the
zoning amendment until the land is dedicated. In a situation where a
legislative body finds dedication of land reasonably necessitated by a
zoning change,9 2 this form of conditional zoning will be effective. 93
Ordinance Conditioned Upon Execution of a Restrictive Covenant
The municipality may require the landowner to execute and record
117 (1963). This appears to be the intent of the California Uniformity Statute. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852 (West 1966).
89. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 420, 79 Cal. Rptr.
872, 878 (1969); Stiriz v. Stout, 210 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
90. See Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr.
872 (1969).
91. This actually happened in one case, and the court refused to require the city to
return the dedicated land. Gregory Manor v. City of Clifton, 53 N.J. Super. 482, 147
A.2d 595 (1959).
92. As, for example, where a rezoning permitted a large apartment house in a
single family residential area. Here, a large influx of residents into the area might bring
about a need for more park space which could be met by the landowner's dedication of
land. See notes 123-24 & accompanying text infra.
93. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 418, 79 Cal. Rptr.
872, 877 (1969).
[Vol. 23
CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING
a restrictive covenant prior to or in conjunction with the passage of the
zoning ordinance. 9- Such a covenant provides flexibility in the types
of restrictions which may be imposed upon the land use. However,
several problems concerning the enforceability of the covenant arise
when this method is used. For an enforceable covenant to exist, there
must be either a grant of land or a contract involving covenantor and
a covenantee. A recorded declaration of restrictions "is only a uni-
lateral declaration of intent on the part of the subdivider to restrict the
lands upon later conveyance" and is unenforceable. 95
To remain within the definition of conditional zoning the restric-
tive covenant must be contained within a grant of land. This necessary
grant of land may be accomplished in any of several ways. The re-
strictive covenant may be contained in a deed to the city of land dedi-
cated for public use.16 Dedication, however, may not be appropriate
in all situations.9 7 The covenant may also be set out in a draft of a deed
contained in an option to purchase agreement with the city.98 This would
give the city the power for the duration of the option to acquire a
dominant estate capable of enforcing the covenant. Such an arrange-
ment may not be satisfactory because the city would be required to ex-
pend funds to enforce the covenant by purchasing the property. Legis-
lators may well be reluctant to expend tax funds in any large amount
merely to enforce a restrictive covenant involving rezoned land if the
city lacks any vital interest in its enforcement.
The restrictive covenant may be contained in a deed from one pri-
vate party to another. 99 This could be done where a developer has
insisted upon rezoning prior to purchase of the land, and the landowner
is seeking the zoning change in order to sell the property. The city
may refuse to consider the landowner's request for a zone change until
he places in the deed to be conveyed certain restrictions on the use of
the property., The problem is that neither party to the covenant has
any particular interest in seeing that the restrictions are enforced. With-
94. Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1960).
95. Murry v. Lovell, 132 Cal. App. 2d 30, 281 P.2d 316 (1955); MacEllven,
Land Use Control Through Covenants, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 310, 316 (1962).
96. Zoning and Concomitant Agreements, supra note 77, at 198, 204-06. Even
though the burdened land is land owned by the grantor other than the granted land, the
covenant may be enforced in California against successors in interest to the grantor.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1970); 2 B. WITrmN, SUMMARY OF CAL1-
IORNIA LAW § 211A (Supp. 1969); Comment, Covenants Running with the Land-
California's New Legislaitve Approach, 9 SANTA CLAM LAW. 285 (1969).
97. See notes 123-24 & accompanying text infra.
98. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d
118 (1962).
99. Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
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out someone willing and able to enforce them, the restrictions are mean-
ingless. One possible solution is for the city to require that it be given
a power of enforcement by the terms of the covenant. One court has
suggested that this will make the city a third party beneficiary capable
of enforcing the agreement. 100
Of the various methods of contract and conditional zoning, the
most appropriate and universally applicable would seem to be the uni-
lateral contract between city and landowner, since the enforcement
power is clear and its legality is supportable. Most of the other methods
are appropriate and useful in some situations but are not universally
applicable. When an appropriate method is used, the arguments against
the process appear to be of minimal effect, especially when balanced
against the flexibility it provides and the hardships it ameliorates.
Contract and Conditional Zoning in California
The validity of the contract and conditional zoning process in Cali-
fornia is unclear at the present. While it is evident that the process is
in use'0 1 there are only three cases which have alluded to its validity,
and the California Supreme Court has not directly held on the question.
The first California case to discuss contract zoning was Acker v.
Baldwin."°2 This was an action by a property owner challenging the
validity of a zoning ordinance which classified his previously unzoned
property as single-family residential. The trial court found that the
city was founded with the intention that its inhabitants would carry on
light commercial uses on their residential property and thus held the
ordinance invalid. The supreme court reversed the decision, and with
reference to the trial court's findings of the founders' intention made
what seems to be the first statement on contract zoning in California:
Considering the findings, it is not made clear by them what the
intention of the "founders" of Temple City was or how it may now
be ascertained. In any event, such intention is immaterial, for the
police power is not subject to the mental state of realtors who
lay out a subdivision. Nor may the police power be limited by
private contract.' 03
The next case to mention contract zoning was Griffin v. County of
Marin' which was an action by property owners challenging the valid-
ity of an ordinance rezoning their property from light industrial to resi-
dential. The trial court excluded evidence offered by the county to the
effect that when the property was originally rezoned light industrial the
100. State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
101. See note 35 supra.
102. 18 Cal. 2d 341, 115 P.2d 455 (1941).
103. Id. at 345, 115 P.2d at 458.
104. 157 Cal. App. 2d 507, 321 P.2d 148 (1958).
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property owners had represented to the board of supervisors that they
intended to use the property for a woodworking furniture shop and
residence and for no other purpose. The appellate court ruled that
the evidence was properly excluded on the ground that "[t]he police
power to zone property may not be limited by private agreement."
10 5
The only case to squarely deal with the question of contract or
conditional zoning in California is Scrutton v. County of Sacramento.-0 6
Here, the plaintiff owned land which she sought to have rezoned from
agricultural to multifamily residential for apartment development. The
board of supervisors was willing to rezone the property if Mrs. Scrutton
would dedicate a ten-foot right of way for widening the avenue on
which the property fronted, dedicate a twenty-seven foot strip for wid-
ening the avenue on the eastern edge of her property, and pay for its
paving. Following their usual procedure, the board refused to rezone
until Mrs. Srutton executed a deed and contract to the above effect.
10 7
A portion of the contract provided that failure to comply with all condi-
tions imposed by the county would cause the property's reversion to
agricultural zoning. Objecting to the demands for dedication and pav-
ing on the east, Mrs. Scrutton refused to sign the contract and brought an
action for declaratory relief against the board. The trial court gave
summary judgment for the city.
The appellate court held that the reversion provision of the pro-
posed contract would amount to a second rezoning in violation of both
procedural and substantive limitations on the board's power. 0 8 How-
ever, the court noted that other enforcement remedies were available to
the county upon such theories as breach of contract, breach of re-
strictive covenant, or breach of an equitable servitude.10 9
In response to Mrs. Scrutton's attack on the county's action as
contract zoning, the appellate court held that while the county itself was
not a party to an express contract, the zoning agency had a moral obli-
gation not to reverse its decision." 0 It went on to point out that the
imposition of conditions had been upheld in California in connection
with the approval of subdivisions, the granting of building permits, and
the granting of zoning variances: "The same police power which sup-
ports the imposition of reasonable conditions upon other kinds of
105. Id. at 514-15, 321 P.2d at 153-54.
106. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
107. Thus, the county incorporated two methods of contract and conditional zon-
ing-the unilateral contract (discussed at the text accompanying notes 77-80 supra) and
the ordinance conditioned on an act involving other property (discussed at notes 90-93
supra).
108. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
109. 275 Cal. App. 2d 420-21, 79 Cal. Rptr. 879.
110. Id. at 419, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
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change in land use sustains the power of California counties to engage
in 'conditional rezoning'.""' However, the court stated such condi-
tions could only be valid "if reasonably conceived to fulfill public
needs emanating from the landowner's proposed use."'1 2 This public
need may be either a need for "protection against potentially deleterious
effects of the landowner's proposal . . ."I" or a "need for facilities
to meet public service demands created by the proposal . . ."" The
court reversed and remanded the decision to the trial court for a de-
termination of whether such need was present.
The court noted that the lack of statutory authority was no barrier
to conditional zoning in California:
The state statutes' silence on conditional rezoning is not a denial
of power to pursue that practice. The practice must find its
own justification as an appropriate exercise of the local police
power.115
One limitation of the Scrutton decision is its implication that only
conditions which do not directly affect the property's use-i.e., which
allow the landowner to use his property for all purposes permitted within
the zoning classification-would not violate the statutory requirement
that zoning regulations be uniform.' 16 Such a limitation would unnec-
essarily restrict the usefulness of contract and conditional zoning." 7
Although the condition imposed in Scrutton is a valid use of condi-
tional zoning in a situation where the landowner's proposed use in-
creases the need for street facilities, the process of contract and condi-
tional zoning is just as useful in numerous other situations that should
not be precluded by a restrictive reading of Scrutton.
A reasonable interpretation of pertinent California statutes indi-
cates that Scrutton should not be so restricted. The California uniform-
ity statute states:
All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of
building or use of land throughout each zone, but the regulation in
one type of zone may differ from those in other types of zones." 5
The question which immediately arises is the meaning of the term
"such regulations." Although there appears to be no case law inter-
preting the phrase, the following analysis seems proper. If the phrase
111. Id. at 418, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
112. Id. at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 417, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77.
116. Id. at 418-19, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
117. The case did not directly hold that conditions affecting the land use would
violate the uniformity objective, but it did strongly imply that they would.
118. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852 (West 1966).
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applies to all efforts to regulate land use in conjunction with zoning,
then it may legitimately be argued that contract and conditional zoning
agreements violate the statute in many cases. However, such applica-
tion would also invalidate the conditions attached to the granting of
variances or conditional use permits." 9
A more plausible interpretation requires a review of section 65850
of the California Government Code which empowers the legislative
bodies to regulate by ordinance certain enumerated items. 120 Thus, the
term "such regulations" would seem to refer to regulations contained
in an ordinance, and not to all land use regulations appurtenant to the
zoning process. Under this interpretation the implied limitations in
Scrutton are unnecessary, and the application of contract or conditional
zoning would not be limited to conditions which do not directly affect
the property's use. It appears then that a reasonable interpretation of
the California statutes would allow full utilization of contract and con-
ditional zoning techniques.
The most immediate question is whether the California Supreme
Court will approve contract and conditional zoning in full, in the lim-
ited form suggested by Scrutton, or at all.' 2 ' Hopefully, if given the
opportunity, the court will grant not only approval to contract and
conditional zoning but will also establish judicial guidelines to insure re-
sponsible use of the process in the future.
Suggested Guidelines
No suggestion is made that California give blanket approval to
contract or conditional zoning. Whether the approval is by judicial
119. See notes 23-24 & accompanying text supra.
120. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65850 (West 1966).
121. In light of the broad power of municipalities to impose conditions precedent
to the approval of a subdivision map recently approved in Associated Home Builders v.
City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), it would
seem that the court will do so. However, it should be noted that the decision in Asso-
ciated Home Builders was based on the constitutionality of a statutory grant of power by
the Legislature, and that the court distinguished in that case between requirements im-
posed on subdividers and those imposed on such developers as apartment house builders.
The distinction developed from an argument by the plaintiff-developers who were chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the exaction of conditions. They argued that the dedi-
cation requirement of the statute arbitrarily imposed its requirements on those who sub-
divide whereas others, such as apartment house developers, may also increase the need
for recreational facilities but will not be required to dedicate. The court replied that
an apartment house uses less land than a subdivision, and thus does not endanger the
limited supply of open space to the same extent as a subdivision. They held that this dis-
tinction justified the special legislative treatment of subdivision developers. Id. at 643,
484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638. This holding does not exclude the exaction
of conditions from apartment house and other nonsubdivision developers. It merely
points out that different types of developments will give rise to different public needs.
decision or legislative enactment it should include careful guidelines
to insure that the process is not abused by either the municipality or
the landowner:
(1) The agreement should be made in such a manner that there
is no abrogation of the police power, either by a promise to rezone or
a promise to maintain a zone for a certain period of time. The mu-
nicipality should carefully avoid any promise on its part in return for
the promise of the landowner.
(2) The rezoning amendment, considered together with and sub-
ject to the landowner's promises, should be a reasonable exercise of the
zoning power. 122  Contract and conditional zoning finds its usefulness
where there are competing uses within a zoning area, each having a
valid claim. In some situations the rezoning alone may not be reason-
able. However, the rezoning subject to the imposed restrictions may
be reasonable. The court should consider both the rezoning and the
landowner's promise in determining the validity of the ordinance. If
the rezoning is unreasonable, even with the restrictions, the ordinance
should be declared invalid.
(3) The landowner's promise should be either already performed
or enforceable by the city so as to insure performance. This means
the court should consider the nature of the agreement between the
landowner and the city. Since the restrictions are worthless if they are
unenforceable, and since the validity of the ordinance may depend
upon its modification by the restrictions, their enforceability is a legiti-
mate concern of the court.
(4) The promises exacted should have a reasonable relation to
the rezoning, i.e., the rezoning itself should give rise to the need for
the restrictions which are imposed. 123  This relation may be established
either by the community's need for protection against potentially de-
leterious effects of the rezoning, or by the community's need for public
service facilities occasioned by the new use. Thus the agreement may
legitimately restrict the landowner's use of his property, or it may re-
quire that he dedicate land to the city for public use. However, ex-
traneous consideration, such as giving land for a park elsewhere in the
city, would impeach the legislation by implying that influence other
than the worth of the rezoning was a part of the decision-making proc-
ess. 124  Without this reasonable relation the exaction has no connec-
122. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 434. 183 N.E.2d
118, 122 (1962).
123. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d, 412, 421, 79 Cal. Rptr.
872, 879 (1969); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 434,
183 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1962); Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.
2d 680, 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1960).
124. Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 434, 183 N.E.2d
118, 122 (1962) (dictum); Trager, supra note 10, at 150-52.
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tion to the zoning ordinance, and the purpose of contract and condi-
tional zoning, which is to achieve needed flexibility, is not served-the
exaction becomes little more than a bribe for a zoning amendment.
The need for flexibility does not stretch so far as to allow the wealthy
landowner to buy a zoning change whenever he desires. It is only
where there is a reasonable nexus between the exactions and the zoning
change that there can be any validity to contract or conditional zoning.
Conclusion
Traditional Euclidian zoning fails to provide necessary zoning flex-
ibility in certain peculiar situations, especially where an area is in the
process of change from one use to another or where conflicting uses
abut. Although the variance and conditional use permit may provide
flexibility in many situations, there are still some instances where these
traditional methods may be unavailable or undesirable. Contract and
conditional zoning offers a reasonable and useful solution to this di-
lemma. 125  The arguments opposing contract and conditional zoning
prove unconvincing in the light of critical examination when tested
against the need for zoning flexibility. The process can be an appro-
priate and beneficial adjunct to the zoning process, especially in an area
of rapid land use change such as California, if the proper method of
imposing the restrictions is used and if certain clearly established judi-
cial guidelines are followed. Within such limits, contract and condi-
tional zoning provides an intermediate approach between absolute de-
nial and complete approval of the zoning change. If a zoning authority
is entrusted and empowered to permit any given use without restric-
tion, the courts should trust it to grant a use which is modified by con-
tract or conditions appropriately attached. In the light of the flexibility
provided under such a process, California courts must affirmatively up-
hold contract and conditional zoning and distinctly clarify its scope and
application.
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125. For an excellent discussion of this proposition see Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County, - Wash. 2d -, 480 P.2d 489, 507 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
126. A further study of contract and conditional zoning is being made for the
American Bar Association. It is expected to be published in 1972. Report of Commit-
mittee on Public Regulation of Land Use, Three Aspects of Zoning: Unincorporated
Areas-Exclusionary Zoning-Conditional Zoning, 6 REAL PRop., PROB. & TRusT
J. 178 (1971).
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